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Justifying constitutional review in
the legitimacy register
A reply to Bello Hutt, Harel and Klatt
Dimitrios Kyritsis
 
1 Introduction
1 The writing of Where Our Protection Lies closed a cycle of theoretical investigation which
aimed to bring a set of philosophical ideas about political legitimacy, collective action,
practical reason and democratic representation to bear on constitutional law and more
specifically the role and justifiability of constitutional adjudication. But theory does not
stand still for long. No sooner did the book come out that another cycle began, as its
claims  are  being  put  under  scrutiny,  some  important  implications  discerned,  and
avenues for further research identified. This process is all the more constructive, when
it is aided by the critical engagement of others. The three reviewers of this symposium
have done just that,  thoughtfully shedding new light on and rigorously challenging
some central claims of the book. For that as well as for their generosity I am grateful. 
2 I start with my response to Donald Bello Hutt’s review, because this will allow me to
frame the present dialectic and set the methodological parameters for the rest of my
reply. Next, I address Alon Harel’s review which offers a vision of constitutional review
sharply  contrasting  to  mine.  It  thus  plays  the  role  of  antithesis.  I  conclude  by
examining Matthias Klatt’s attempt at synthesis. Along the way I hope to make clear
that underlying every step in this schema is the central conviction behind the entire
book: Constitutional law is there to enhance the moral legitimacy of a political regime
by structuring government so that it can reliably and systematically stay the course of
justice. That is the standard against which we must evaluate systems of constitutional
review.
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2 Dialectic (Bello Hutt)
3 In  his  review  Donald  Bello  Hutt  raises  probing  questions  about  the  methodology
underpinning  one  of  my  main  critical  claims,  my  rejection  of  a  certain  style  of
scepticism towards constitutional review. He does so en route to outlining what he
takes  to  be  a  competing  conception  of  the  relationship  between  courts  and
representative institutions such as a democratic legislature. 
4 I  should  begin  by  saying  that  I  particularly  relish  the  opportunity  to  revisit  my
methodology. The book is as much about the substantive issue whether courts may or
should  have  the  power  of  constitutional  review  as  it  is  about  the  methodological
question how we should go about deciding this substantive issue and indeed any other
issue of constitutional law. I elaborate my methodology in chapter one of the book, but
for the most part do not return to it in subsequent chapters. 
5 Chapter  four,  which  is  the  target  of  Bello  Hutt’s  critique,  is  one  place  where  a
methodological excursion would have perhaps helped. There I argue against the claim,
put forward by Richard Bellamy and Jeremy Waldron among others, that constitutional
review is morally unjustified because it violates political equality by giving the views of
a few unelected officials superior voting weight compared to ordinary citizens. I seek to
neutralise this critique by pointing out that political representation, as we know it from
our political  practices,  involves a similar grant of power to elected representatives.
Consequently, Bellamy and Waldron’s critique suffers from overkill. It gives us as much
reason to object to representative democracy as constitutional review.1 
6 Bello Hutt contends that my argument fundamentally misunderstands what is involved
in evaluating this  or  that  political  arrangement.  It  does  not  suffice  to  say that  the
arrangement does not match ‘what happens in real-life’.2 In addition, we must assess it
against  ‘evaluative  standards’,  which Bello  Hutt  calls  ‘regulative  ideals’,  contrasting
them to ‘rationalisations of political practices’.3 In his view, the fact that Bellamy and
Waldron’s  view  is  at  odds  with  prevailing  institutional  manifestations  and
understandings  of  political  representation  does  little  to  discredit  them,  because  it
leaves it open that their view flows from a regulative ideal that is ‘the best reflection of
our practices’.4
7 I agree that rationalisations of practice do not have the requisite normative force. But
my  conception  of  political  representation  goes  well  beyond  a  mere  reporting  of
patterns of practice.  It  is  true that I  start by identifying certain fixed points of the
practices of political representation in the political systems with which we are familiar.
But  I  go  on  to  examine  whether  a  moral  story  can  be  told  that  vindicates  these
practices. I say that by virtue of combining a constraint emanating from the wishes and
opinions  of  constituents  and  an  element  of  independent  judgment,  political
representation, as we know it, is valuable: it balances the demands of popular support
and moral innovation. This moral story bears strong resemblance to Nadia Urbinati’s
conception of representation as advocacy that Bello Hutt prefers. It accepts that while
the wishes and opinions of the electorate are not infinitely malleable and thus pose
genuine  constraints  on  legislative  duty,  practices  of  political  representation  are
structured in a way that allows that these wishes and opinions will be mediated by
deliberation  and  the  independent  judgment  of  legislators.  This  has  important
implications  for  institutional  design:  Representativeness,  thus  understood,  is  what
bestows authority on, say, democratically elected legislatures.
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8 The type of political argument I employ in that part of the book is underpinned by
something like  Ronald Dworkin’s  interpretive method.5 For  Dworkin,  interpreting a
normative  practice  involves  ascribing  to  it  a  point  that  fits  and  justifies  what  we
commonly take to belong to the practice.6 On this understanding, fit and justification
are  two  separate  (though  interrelated)  benchmarks  for  theoretical  success;  a
conception that does not adequately ‘fit’ the practice is pro tanto inferior regardless of
how it  fares along the dimension of justification.7 This is  exactly the charge I  level
against Bellamy and Waldron, which is why my critique focuses primarily on the ‘fit’ of
their view. 
9 Bello  Hutt  might  claim  that  the  interpretive  method  is  equally  vulnerable  to  his
objection. Why should we be shackled to an imperfect practice, albeit one for which a
morally attractive story can be told, when we can identify a morally superior regulative
ideal and then assess ‘whether the practice under scrutiny is closer to or further from
the ideal’?8 This is a perfectly appropriate question to ask of any normative practice.9
Even if a practice is worthwhile, we may still be better off abandoning it. In the book I
consider whether Bellamy and Waldron would want to pursue this strategy.10 I argue
that, while it is in principle open to them, it comes at a high cost. A radical reform of
our political practices in the name of political equality, as they understand it, will not
only sweep away constitutional review but also much of representative government.
Bellamy and Waldron may decide to bite the bullet, but it is a hard bullet to bite. 
10 I anticipate the same general move earlier in the book. In chapter one I discuss the
relationship between history and moralised constitutional theory, which is my label for
the methodological outlook grounding the overall project. I  argue that according to
moralised constitutional theory the political record of a legal order partly determines
the content of its constitutional law, much like fit partly determines interpretation. I
then consider the objection that this creates a conservative bias blocking from view
radical  but  morally  superior  constitutional  options.11 While  I  acknowledge  the
importance of utopian moral reflection, I insist that determining what the state may
do, as constrained by the political record, performs a distinctive moral role: it furnishes
a benchmark for the legitimate use of state force here and now. The same argument
can be directed to Bello Hutt. We may have strong moral reason to reform our practices
of political representation, but political legitimacy dictates that our moral reasoning
hew more closely to what we have done and decided in the past. It is the latter exercise
that animates constitutional law doctrine. 
 
3 Antithesis (Harel)
11 Applying the method of moralised constitutional theory, the book advances a modest
institutional  recommendation,  namely  that  in  some jurisdictions  and under  certain
(not necessarily exceptional) circumstances it may be legitimate for courts to have the
power to review primary legislation for its conformity with the constitution but that it
may not be in others or under different circumstances. This pits me against theorists
like  Alon  Harel  who  maintain  that  constitutional  review is  always  permissible  and
indeed morally obligatory because individuals have an across-the-board right to such a
procedure. In the book I specifically engage with Harel’s thesis that such a right can be
derived from a more abstract moral right to a hearing. 
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12 In his review, Harel puts forward a different but equally intriguing proposal. He argues
that  constitutional  review is the  correct  procedure for  vindicating our fundamental
rights such as the right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion by virtue of
the fact that it  expresses the correct attitude towards those rights.  When it  strikes
down a law that violates rights as unconstitutional and therefore invalid,  the court
signals that the legislature strayed beyond its proper sphere of authority; it exercised a
power that it never had. As Harel puts it, ‘a judicial decision which pronounces that
prohibiting  the  burning  of  the  flag  is  unconstitutional  conveys  unambiguously  the
message that the prohibition on burning the flag is a wrong’.12 By contrast, the message
is muddled when we entrust the protection of our rights to the legislature. Suppose the
legislature refrains from prohibiting the burning of the flag. Since it must also act on
‘concerns about the public good’,13 it is not clear whether the legislature’s omission is
motivated by respect for the right to free speech or whether it  is  solely or mainly
driven  by  ‘concerns  for  efficiency  or  utility’,14 which  happen  to  point  in  the  same
direction  as  respect  for  the  right  to  free  speech.  It  is  also  not  clear  whether  the
legislature believed that it ‘had indeed a power to prohibit the burning of the flag but it
decided not to use its power’.15
13 What follows from this in terms of  institutional  design? Just  as with the right to a
hearing, this proposal envisages a non-instrumental relation between a moral idea and
institutional design.16 For Harel, because of the ‘expressive’ advantage of constitutional
adjudication over legislation, constitutional review is justified, independently of
whether courts are better than legislatures at reaching the correct result concerning
the content of our rights. By the same token other participants in the joint project of
governing,  importantly legislatures themselves,  owe judicial  decisions enforcing the
constitution against primary legislation a duty of deference.17 
14 As  a  general  matter,  I  have  nothing  against  non-instrumental  justifications  of
institutional design, though I would insist that such justifications must compete with -
and may sometimes lose out to- instrumental ones. Furthermore, I do not want to deny
that we should sometimes care about the expressive dimension of political decision-
making.  Can a  story  be  told  along expressive  lines  about  constitutional  rulings?  In
order fully to answer this question I would need to evaluate the substantive part of
Harel’s proposal,  the idea that there is something valuable in the state sending the
message that it has no business treading on individual rights.18 This broader inquiry
will  have  to  wait  another  occasion.  Here,  I  only  want  to  focus  on  the  alleged
implications of that idea for institutional design. 
15 To  begin  with,  Harel’s  proposal  does  not  seem  to  encompass  systems  of  weak
constitutional  review,  where  courts  can  declare a  statute  incompatible  with  a
fundamental right but not invalidate it. In this sense, it fails to ‘fit’ an important part of
the practice. But the mismatch is not only descriptive. A deeper, normative issue lurks
here. Plausibly,  legal orders that have adopted weak constitutional review have not
thereby abandoned their commitment to fundamental rights. If we are not willing to
dismiss these legal orders as morally misguided or illegitimate, it is because we think
the following two propositions are compatible: 1) a person or body is morally bound by
a certain rule. 2) nobody else is authorised to enforce (or even monitor) compliance
with the rule against that person or body. Proposition 2 has particular force when the
person or body has democratic credentials. Of course, we may have all sorts of reason
to mistrust a political arrangement that grants unchecked power to a person or body,
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relying only on their inner moral compunction to refrain from wrongdoing. But they
would  not  be  the  kind of  reason that  Harel  is  after.  They are,  as  Dworkin  puts  it,
outcome-driven, pertaining to the question whether our political institutions are set up
so that they reliably and systematically govern well. 
16 It  might  be  objected  to  this  line  of  reasoning  that  the  expressive  value  of  a
constitutional  ruling is  preserved even if  its  authoritative  impact  is  watered down.
After all, the court does not (need to) mince its words when it declares that a piece of
primary legislation is incompatible with human rights. But this suggestion would run
up against another thesis Harel endorses, namely that a system of legislative protection
of rights fails to pay rights their due because ‘in the absence of judicial review, the
rights of individuals in a democracy are contingent on the judgements and inclinations
of the majority’.19 By contrast, as we have seen, Harel thinks what counts in favour of
constitutional review is that it completely removes from majoritarian decision-making
an issue that properly falls within the sphere of individual discretion. It seems the same
cannot be said of weak constitutional review. 
17 Harel  could,  of  course,  decide  to  bite  the  bullet  and  insist  that  his  account  only
recommends strong constitutional review. However, I am sceptical that the expressive
value  of  constitutional  rulings,  such  that  there  is,  can  bear  the  weight  for  this
institutional recommendation. Republicanism has taught us that we should be worried
not only when we entrust our lives to the judgments and inclinations of the majority
but, more generally, when we put ourselves at the mercy of another. This worry applies
as much to judges as it does to legislators.20 As a matter of fact, it is part of the essence
of politics. The fact that judges couch their decisions in terms of the meaning of the
constitution does not eliminate the element of personal judgment and hence the risks
from  heteronomy.  After  all,  judges  decide  on  the  basis  of  what  they  interpret  the
constitution to mean. If you take seriously the republican concern of domination, it will
be but little comfort that their interpretations express judgments about the limits of
political power.21 It will probably be of much more importance to you, first, to have a
meaningful say in the decision and, second, to have assurances that the body with the
authority to decide, whether it be a court or a legislature, will reliably get it right. It is
the balance between these two kinds of consideration that calls the shots. 
 
4 Synthesis (Klatt)
18 In this short reply it is impossible to do justice to Matthias Klatt’s wide-ranging review
or  to  fully  map my account  onto  his  own rich  theory  of  institutional  cooperation.
Especially the latter task requires an iterative process that incrementally brings our
respective  conceptual  toolkits  into  closer  conversation  with  each  other.  Klatt
inaugurated this process in his review. Here I shall try to keep it up by raising a worry
that  the  rapprochement  of  the  two  theories  might  run  into  a  rather  fundamental
philosophical obstacle. Building on this worry I shall address some more specific areas
of contention.
19 Klatt finds common ground between us in the idea that the moral justifiability of the
overall system of constitutional review and of specific acts within this system is the
outcome of balancing two types of moral consideration, which I call considerations of
content  and  institutional  design.  This  distinction  is  strikingly  similar  to  Klatt’s
distinction between material and formal principles. Like me, he contends that in order
Justifying constitutional review in the legitimacy register
Revus, in print | 2020
5
to allocate institutional competences we must balance these two types of principle. In
addition,  he  denies,  as  I  do,  that  there  are  ‘unconditional  preference  relations’22
between these principles.23 So, are we talking about the same thing? 
20 To  answer  this  question,  I  must  first  stress  that  in  Klatt’s  hands  balancing  has  a
technical  sense.  He  regards  formal  and  material  principles  as  optimization
requirements. This means that their normative force is not all-or-nothing. Rather, we
conform to them by optimizing them within the confines of what is feasible, where
what is feasible is also a function of what other principles are at stake. When more than
one principle is at stake, we must decide which one should take priority under the
circumstances.  In  turn,  this  determination  hangs  on  ‘the  specific  weights  these
principles have in a given case’.24 We ask: Does the seriousness of the setback suffered
by one principle outweigh the improvement caused to the other? If so, then the first
principle takes precedence. 
21 Prima facie, there is a marked difference between Klatt’s balancing method and the way
considerations  of  content  and  institutional  design  are  supposed  to  interact  in  my
theory.  I  use  the  term  ‘balancing’  loosely  to  mean  simply  that  these  two  types  of
consideration are joint determinants of the moral justifiability of constitutional review.
25 But I do not hold the further view that we combine them by seeking to jointly realize
them to the greatest extent possible. What, then, happens when they are in tension?
What happens, for instance, when institutional design dictates that we give effect to a
decision because it  was made by the competent body,  but that  decision offers sub-
optimal protection to one of our fundamental rights? For Klatt, my answer to these
questions is in need of further elaboration and at times perplexing, so let me try in the
following paragraphs to restate it more clearly.
22 It is worth recalling at this point what I take to be the general structure of the moral
justification of systems of constitutional review. I argue that the guiding star of this
justificatory exercise is the concept of political legitimacy. This means that we do not
have  a  free-standing  concern to  promote  democracy,  say,  or  fundamental  rights.
Rather,  we  care  about  democracy  and  fundamental  rights  and  all  the  other
considerations of content and institutional design insofar as they matter for legitimacy.
Hence, the issue is not simply how much fundamental rights protection will suffer if
the  court  refrains  from  striking  down  the  sub-optimal  legislative  decision  of  our
example, but whether in doing so the court enhances or undermines the legitimacy of
the overall political regime.26 
23 Am I exaggerating the difference between the two methods? Klatt might insist that -
assuming  I  am  right  about  the  connection  between  legitimacy  and  constitutional
review- they can still be made compatible. He might say that when we work out the
relative  weights  of  formal  and  material  principles,  what  we  do  is  measure  the
contribution of each to political legitimacy in the circumstances of a specific case. After
all,  the balancing method furnishes  a  formal  structure that  needs to  be filled with
sound premises from moral theory. And if sound moral theory dictates that the point of
constitutional law is to enhance legitimacy, then surely we should adjust the weights of
the  items  we  put  on  the  scales  accordingly.  So,  as  far  as  the  balancing  theory  is
concerned there is nothing stopping us from formulating our inquiry not in terms of
how detrimental to democracy an exercise of judicial power is but rather how seriously
that setback affects the legitimacy of the political regime (given that democracy is one
of the things that contribute to it). 
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24 Perhaps  this  manoeuvre would  get  around  some  of  the  difficulties.  Still,  I  am  not
entirely convinced that what we do when we balance institutional design and content
with an eye to enhancing legitimacy is best understood as optimization to begin with.
For  instance,  in  the  book  I  am  keen  to  emphasize  that  legitimacy  makes  political
history morally relevant.27 I cannot repeat my argument for this claim here. Suffice it to
say  that,  by  virtue  of  its  dependence  on  political  history,  legitimacy  sometimes
recommends  a  policy  or  institutional  arrangement  because  it  is  the  one  that  our
political community has settled upon (and certain other conditions are met). In such
cases it strikes me as not pertinent to the issue of legitimacy to ask whether this policy
or arrangement is the closest we can get to justice under the circumstances, which is
what the balancing method seems to boil down to. 
25 Mind you, when he speaks of balancing, Klatt specifically allows for the contingency of
constitutional law. He subscribes to the special case thesis which sees constitutional
reasoning as moral reasoning constrained by past political decisions.28 But insofar as
moral reasoning is still taken to be about optimizing principles of political morality, a
residual difference remains. Indeed, on my view legitimacy might on occasion condemn
optimization of a certain principle. In the book I explored a dimension of legitimacy
that brings out this possibility. I wrote that, in order for a regime to be legitimate, it
must  be  equipped  with  standing  guarantees  against  the  abuse  of  power.  Such
assurances are an important part of the package that the regime must be able to offer
those subject to it in exchange for their allegiance. Otherwise the cost of submission to
the regime becomes prohibitively high. This is not only because states will often pursue
policies some of us object to. It is also because state power is so immense and the risks
from its being abused so great that it ought never be bestowed on someone without
robust limits. It would seem to follow from this that even some good ideas about how to
promote this or that political value may on occasion have to be sacrificed, because if we
gave our political institutions the power to implement them we would be loosening a
desirable break on government overreach. A similar thought often motivates the desire
to control the administrative state.
26 A related problem arises out of Klatt’s view that the balancing of formal and material
principles  should  be  made  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  He  writes  that  ‘once  a  system
provides for judicial review at all, the full range of scrutiny is in principle available to
the courts’.29 How else can they determine the relative weights of competing principles
in  specific  circumstances?  My legitimacy-based account  would  shy away from such
sweeping particularism. While sometimes the reasoning of the reviewing court will be
context-specific,  there  are  strong reasons,  reasons  of  legitimacy,  why sometimes  it
should not. One of those reasons is that a legitimate polity must be more or less stable.
In order to pledge their allegiance to it, citizens need to be confident that the scheme of
government it establishes will not drastically change mid-sea, shifting political power
from  one  institution  to  another  without  notice.30 I  would  argue  that  the  need  for
stability recommends general and standing allocations of government power and thus
lies in tension with Klatt’s highly context-specific approach.
27 So far, I have tried to show that legitimacy can help determine the moral import of
competing considerations of content and institutional design and have assumed that on
the  basis  of  this  determination  we  can  then  judge  their  relative  weight.  This
assumption has been challenged by those who question the commensurability of these
two types of moral consideration.31 How, they ask, can you trade off a blow to freedom
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of speech against a gain in democracy? According to Klatt, an adequate account of the
interplay between considerations of content and institutional design must be able to
respond  to  this  question.  In  the  book  I  argue  that  the  theoretical  importance  of
incommensurability is  vastly  exaggerated.  I  contend that,  although the  comparison
between content and institutional design may lead to some weak indeterminacy, it is
not radically or strongly indeterminate. 
28 I should stress here that it is of particular significance that the comparison takes place
under the auspices of the overall principle of political legitimacy. Here is an example to
illustrate  the  point.  Some  theorists  have  suggested  that  comprehensive  aims  like
starting a family or choosing a profession are typically incommensurable.32 How do you
even begin to compare the career of an investment banker and that of a piano virtuoso?
But the comparison could become a lot more tractable if the question is which career is
more  suitable  for  me  and  I  am  good  with  numbers  but  not  particularly  musical.
Similarly,  even if  it  is  impossible  to rank freedom of  speech and democracy in the
abstract, legitimacy brings with it a host of more specific demands and concerns that
might help us assign these two principles relative priority within a given context.
29 Regardless of the merit of my arguments against incommensurability, Klatt offers me a
different route. He proposes that I abandon the ‘combination model’, as he calls it, in
favour of the ‘separation model’. According to the latter, we are only allowed to balance
among formal principles, for example democracy and judicial independence. What we
cannot do is  what the combination model allows,  namely balancing a formal and a
material principle. I need to hear more about the separation model, but I am inclined to
stick to my guns. I do not think that only formal principles matter for legitimacy, and I
reject the proceduralist strategy of using reasonable disagreement to preempt recourse
to  material  principles.  So,  the  separation model  runs  counter  to  the  conception of
legitimacy underpinning my account. 
30 Klatt worries that some things I say in the book belie my vehemence. For instance, he
points  to  my  invocation  of  Ronald  Dworkin’s  distinction  between  background  and
institutional rights.33 I do not see how embracing this distinction commits me to the
separation  model.  The  distinction  is  not  one  between  rights  determined  solely  by
considerations  of  content  and  those  determined  solely  by  considerations  of
institutional  design.  Institutional  rights  are  those  that  we  have  as  part  of  an
authoritative  structure.  Depending  on  one’s  conception  of  the  principle  governing
permissible  action  within  that  structure,  it  is  perfectly  conceivable  to  hold  that
institutional rights are determined by a combination of considerations of content and
institutional design -indeed, this is my view and Klatt’s. By contrast, background rights
supply  the  standard  against  which  we  judge  the  decisions  and  practices  of  that
authoritative  structure  and  consequently  are  independent  of  considerations  of
institutional design which grant those decisions and practices normative weight. 
31 With this we return to a key message of the book: In a by-and-large legitimate system
of government the morally sub-optimal is sometimes morally binding: Our institutional
rights fall  short of our background rights. This is the price we pay in exchange for
living in a legitimate polity, one whose main political institutions are arranged so that
they can reliably and systematically stay the course of justice. When we put in place a
system of constitutional review, we task courts to correct some of our moral mistakes.
To do this, they cannot simply look at the formal allocation of state power. They must
consider the meaning and urgency of our substantive rights. At the same time courts
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are but one component of the system of government; their authority to correct our
mistakes and hence to be guided by our background rights is accordingly limited. 
—Acknowledgments.— I owe special thanks to Donald Bello Hutt who organised this symposium
and provided valuable feedback on an earlier draft. 
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NOTES
1. This argument is  meant to blunt a threat against constitutional review, not to provide an
argument for it.  I  do not subscribe to the view (which Bello Hutt  ascribes to me) that since
‘independent judgement is always a feature of any institution, one should have no problem with
accepting courts  making decisions on behalf  of  the people’  (Bello  Hutt  2019:  53).  Granting a
power to any official requires a justification. My account of representation (roughly) justifies
having an elected legislature govern us. I employ a very different justification, one based on the
value of judicial independence, to defend the permissibility of constitutional review. 
2. Bello Hutt 2019: 43.
3. Bello Hutt 2019: 40.
4. Bello Hutt 2019: 43.
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5. See generally Dworkin 1998: 49ff.
6. Dworkin’s interpretive method is not dissimilar from Urbinati’s: She, too, carefully examines
the range of historical manifestations and influential understandings of political representation
and seeks to ‘cast them in their best moral light’. Of course, that is not to say that they also reach
similar conclusions regarding the role of legislatures. 
7. Furthermore, the requirement of fit does not reflect considerations of ‘practical feasibility’
which for Bello Hutt cannot be decisive. (Bello Hutt 2019: 45) Rather, it is based on a distinction
between what counts as a genuine interpretation of a practice as opposed to a call for its reform.
8. Bello Hutt 2019: 45.
9. Here I  am setting aside the crucial question how we identify the Archimedean point from
which to criticize the practice.
10. Kyritsis 2017: 96-97.
11. Kyritsis 2017: 31-32.
12. Harel 2019: 16.
13. Harel 2019: 16.
14. Harel 2019: 16.
15. Harel 2019: 17.
16. An important difference between the two proposals is that, whereas the right to a hearing is
meant to be a pre-political moral idea, the ‘expressive’ dimension of constitutional adjudication
seems to only make sense in the context of politics, where a body has authority to make decisions
that are binding on others. 
17. In order to explicate ‘legislative deference’,  the deference owed judicial  decisions by the
legislature, Harel employs my distinction between epistemic and robust deference. I introduce
this distinction Kyritsis 2017: ch 7 in the course of offering an account of ‘judicial deference’, but,
as I explain, it could apply more generally to any official who must give normative weight to the
decision of another. That is because the distinction pertains to the ‘how’ or mode of deference as
opposed  to  the  ‘why’  or  trigger  of  deference.  Different  reasons  might  trigger  judicial  and
legislative deference, but, if I am right, both will assume one or the other mode. 
18. We should bear in mind that constitutional rulings seldom make reference directly to our
moral rights. Typically, they appeal to our constitutional rights. The relation between the two is
not always straightforward. Importantly for Harel’s purposes, we should expect that not all of
our constitutional rights have the same expressive significance.
19. Harel 2019: 18.
20. Interestingly  Harel  inverses  the  traditional  republican  objection  to  judicial  review.  For
republican  theorists  judicial  review  is  problematic  because  it  exposes  us  to  domination  by
officials over whom we have no political control, whereas this is not the case with democratically
elected legislators.
21. See relatedly Bello Hutt 2017: 20-21
22. Klatt 2017: 27
23. This  is  the  position  of  proceduralists  such  as  Waldron  who  argue  that  it  is  a  ‘category
mistake’ to balance content and institutional design; rather, because we disagree about content,
we may only  invoke  considerations  of  institutional  design to  justify  political  action.  I  argue
against proceduralism in Kyritsis 2017: 10-13.
24. Klatt 2017: 25
25. I offer some general critical comments on the notion of balancing in Kyritsis 2014: 400-2.
26. In this sense, legitimacy is the broadest moral concept within which more specific moral
principles  are  nested.  Klatt  takes  issue  with  the  fact  that  I  use  the  term  ‘overarching’  to
characterise separation of powers. He ‘[doubts] whether all factors relevant for the legitimacy of
judicial review could be characterized as sub-aspects of the separation of powers’ (Klatt 2019: 30).
I do not deny that there are moral considerations that are relevant for legitimacy but do not fall
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within separation of powers. But that is not incompatible with saying that separation of powers
incorporates several subordinate considerations of institutional design. For instance, separation
of powers comprises what I call a division of labour dimension, which encompasses democracy
and efficiency. One way to give effect to separation of powers, then, is by allocating government
power such that institutions instantiating the principle of democracy or the value of efficiency
perform  a  consequential  role.  Relative  to  efficiency  and  democracy  separation  of  powers  is
indeed overarching.
27. Kyritsis 2017: 22-27.
28. Klatt 2019: 28.
29. Klatt 2019: 32.
30. I  qualify this claim in Kyritsis 2017:  ch 9, where I offer the main elements of a theory of
permissible constitutional change by courts. 
31. See among others Allan 2006.
32. Raz 1986: 292. It must be noted that Raz does not think comprehensive aims are radically
indeterminate.
33. Dworkin 1978: 93.
ABSTRACTS
In this article I restate and sharpen key claims of my book Where Our Protection Lies, responding
to the reviews written by Donald Bello Hutt, Alon Harel, and Matthias Klatt for this symposium. I
first explicate the role that practice plays in my argument against critics of constitutional review
and, more broadly, in my account of the value of democratic representation. This allows me to
clarify  and  defend  the  general  methodology  I  employ  in  the  book,  which  I  label  moralised
constitutional theory (MCT). Against Bello Hutt I argue that MCT does not merely rationalise
existing practice; it heeds existing practice only to the extent that it can morally legitimate state
power in the special way that constitutional law is meant to do. I then go on to evaluate Harel’s
suggestion that constitutional review evinces the proper attitude towards rights; it expresses the
idea  that  certain  activities  are  off  limits  to  government  regulation.  By  contrast,  legislative
protection  of  our  rights  puts  at  the  majority’s  mercy.  I  contend  that  this  suggestion  has  a
problematic fit with contemporary constitutional practice. More importantly, it does not take
into account that being subject to the authority of a judge also raises concerns about domination,
and those concerns must be balanced against the expressive benefits of constitutional review, if
there are any. Finally, I register a worry concerning the rapprochement that Klatt urges between
our respective theories. Although both theories subscribe to the view that the content of our
constitutional rights and duties is determined by the proper balance of moral considerations
pertaining  to  the  content  of  political  decisions,  on  the one  hand,  and  the  features  of  the
institutional  structure  that  has  produced  them,  on  the  other,  I  am  sceptical  that  these
considerations operate as optimisation requirements.
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